Overseas Contingency Operations

HIGHLIGHTS

Overview

The FY 2010 Overseas Contingency Operations budget request funds U.S. military operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, and around the globe through September 2010.

Continuing the Fight

- Operations
- Force Protection
- Improvised Explosive Device Defeat
- Military Intelligence
- Afghan National Security Forces
- Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund
- Coalition Support
- Commander's Emergency Response Program
- Military Construction

Reconstituting the Force

Reconstitution






















Overseas Contingency Operations

OVERVIEW

The Department of Defense requests a total of \$130.0 billion primarily to support Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) in FY 2010 (Figure 4.1). With this appropriation, Congress will fund U.S. military operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, and around the globe through September 2010.

Figure 4.1 Historical DoD Funding FY01 to FY10



Note: Numbers in this table have been updated from previously published figures to better reflect transfers, rescissions, non-war supplementals, and scoring captured by DoD and OMB databases Source: FY 2009 OMB Historical Tables, Table 5.4; Comptroller Information Systems

Nine years of operations in multiple theaters have put incredible stress on personnel and equipment. Incremental Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding provided pay and benefits to the All-Volunteer Force and replaced, repaired, and replenished equipment eroded through continual use in theater. Despite these strains, the FY 2010 OCO request represents approximately a 10 percent decrease from the Department's FY 2009 OCO funding level of \$145.1 billion.

U.S. ENGAGEMENT IN IRAQ, AFGHANISTAN, AND PAKISTAN

With the comprehensive strategic reviews of Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan now complete, the United States is taking steps to rebalance its global efforts and to meet the challenges faced in Overseas Contingency Operations. In Iraq, the United States will see through the responsible drawdown of forces, building on Iraq's improved yet fragile security gains. In Afghanistan, new efforts will bring to bear the coordinated efforts of the U.S. and its allies, and will support Pakistan in denying safe haven to the extremists that threaten the democratic government in Islamabad, our regional partners, and the U.S. homeland.

Iraq

The United States seeks to assist in establishing an Iraq that is sovereign, stable and self-reliant; an Iraqi government that is just, representative, and accountable; neither a safe haven for, nor sponsor of, terrorism; integrated into the global economy; and a long-term partner contributing to regional peace and security.

On February 27, 2009, the President outlined the planned drawdown of U.S. forces in Iraq and the change in mission by August 31, 2010. By this time, U.S. forces will have completed the transition from combat and counterinsurgency to a more limited mission set focused on training and assisting the Iraqi

Security Forces (ISF); providing force protection for U.S. military and civilian personnel and facilities; and conducting targeted counterterrorism operations and supporting civilian agencies and international organizations in their capacity-building efforts. Further drawdowns will occur in accordance with the U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement. The pace of the drawdown takes into consideration Iraq's improved, yet fragile, security gains and provides U.S. commanders sufficient flexibility to assist the Iraqis with emerging challenges. As combat brigades are responsibly redeployed, the U.S. will also continue to pursue other aspects of its strategy, including a sustained diplomatic effort with a more peaceful and prosperous Iraq.

Military Achievements

As a result of ISF operational successes over the last year and other factors, security incidents are now at the lowest levels since early 2004. The ISF and the Coalition forces have achieved these security gains while continuing to draw down Coalition forces below pre-surge levels. Although security gains remain fragile, the ISF continue to demonstrate a growing capability and confidence while leading operations throughout the country.

Political Achievements

Iraq continued to make political and legislative progress. The most significant accomplishments over the past few months include the Government of Iraq's (Gol's) ratification of the Strategic Framework Agreement and the Security Agreement with the United States on December 4, 2008, the successful transfer of security authority from Coalition forces to the Gol on January 1, 2009, the successful conduct of provincial elections in 14 of Iraq's 18 provinces on January 31, 2009, and the passage of the 2009 Iraqi budget on March 5, 2009. The willingness of the Gol to confront militias, regardless of sect, has encouraged parties to engage in the political process.

Economic Achievements

The GoI has improved national and provincial budget execution and the distribution of essential services, although investment on capital projects continues to fall short of needed spending. Investments in electrical generation have led to a stable national grid, improved reliability, and recent all-time highs in generation.



The collapse in oil prices, however, has prompted several revisions to the recently-passed 2009 Iraqi Budget. Volatile oil prices have refocused the attention of Iraqi leaders on oil infrastructure, although the results of major improvements will not be felt for several years. While continuing to seek reductions, the GoI remains focused on opportunities to generate economic growth and diversify Iraq's economy beyond oil.

Much Remains to Be Done

Despite the positive developments, national reconciliation and accommodation continue to be hindered by the pursuit of ethnosectarian agendas and disagreements over the distribution of power and resources. This is underscored by significant distrust between partisan national leaders. Arab-Kurd tensions continue to grow, surrounding the debate over the centralization versus decentralization of power, the resolution of disputed internal boundaries, property rights and restitution, the status of the Kurdistan Regional Government's Peshmerga, the status of Kirkuk, and the resolution of hydrocarbon policy. Tensions between the Iraqi Army and the Peshmerga in and around disputed territories continue to be a flashpoint for potential violence. In addition, longstanding Sunni-Shi'a discord remains, with some Sunnis suspicious of the extent of the Shi'a political parties' ties to Iran and doubtful of the Gol's long-term commitment to the (Sons of Iraq) Sol transition program and the implementation of the Amnesty and Accountability and Justice Laws. Furthermore, there is growing opposition between those favoring a strong central government versus a highly decentralized government. The Gol will face challenges as it continues to assume authority for security detainees and as it addresses the long-term issue of resettling refugees and internally displaced persons. These issues will require Irag's political blocs to overcome their fears and build coalitions that reach across ethnic lines to compromise on sensitive political issues. National elections, scheduled for the end of 2009 or early 2010, will be a

key turning point in the process of consolidating Iraq's democracy.

The Gol's ability to spend its resources, improve the delivery of essential services, and promote economic development has progressed measurably. However, Iraq's economy continues to be constrained by a lack of transparency, endemic corruption, weak technical skills, and a poor legal framework. The agricultural and agribusiness sectors could advance economic growth, but are distorted by subsidies. A decline in oil revenues will put an added strain on a government that has had difficulty delivering basic services. Iraq will need to implement economic reforms and pass key legislation to take full advantage of foreign and domestic investment.

Debt relief, economic support, and other strategic initiatives are helping, as is Iraq's diplomatic outreach to neighboring countries and other nations. Jordan, Bahrain, Kuwait, Syria, and the United Arab Emirates have formally named ambassadors to Iraq. Egypt and Qatar have announced their intention to identify and send ambassadors. In September 2008, after significant delay, the Gol helped to strengthen these ties by appointing ambassadors to six neighboring countries: Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Lebanon, Turkey, Syria, and Bahrain. The Iraqis should continue to engage neighboring states on issues of mutual concern, including refugees, border security, and economic ties.

Afghanistan

Against a backdrop of reinstated safe havens in Pakistan, and increasing violence in Afghanistan, the United States continues to work with the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) and our international partners to build an Afghanistan that is never again a safe haven for terrorists. Achieving this strategic goal requires a comprehensive counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign that coordinates the security, governance, and development efforts of the United States and the international community.

In 2008, the security situation in Afghanistan deteriorated in several areas of the country. The spring and summer of 2008 saw the highest levels of violence since the U.S. and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) began their involvement in Afghanistan. Violence is concentrated in the south (the historic heartland of the Taliban) and the east, the area most vulnerable to cross-border activity from neighboring Pakistan. The Taliban regrouped after its fall from power and has coalesced into a resilient and evolving insurgency. The insurgents are challenging the control of the GIRoA in areas of the south and the east, and increasingly in the west.

Military Achievements


The Department's approach to these and other security challenges is to build the capacity of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), ensure security of the Afghan population, and diminish the capacity of insurgent groups. Toward these goals, in February 2009, the President announced the deployment of 17,700 additional U.S. forces, along with supporting and enabling forces to help meet urgent security needs, especially in the south. These additional forces, along with increased Coalition and Afghan forces, will play a pivotal role in eliminating, detaining, or expelling insurgents and antigovernment entities, separating these elements from the general Afghan population. In March 2009, the President approved the deployment of an additional 4,000 U.S. forces, whose primary mission will be to train the ANSF.

The increase in U.S. forces reinforces Afghan and international forces' momentum and enables accelerated growth of the ANSF. The Afghan National Army (ANA) has demonstrated considerable improvements, leading 60 percent of military operations in 2008. The Afghan National Police (ANP) continues its steady development, in large part due to the Focused District Development (FDD) plan, led by the Combined Security

Transition Command – Afghanistan (CSTC-A).

The CSTC-A, using the Afghan Security Forces Fund, will continue to lead the planning, programming and implementation of structural, institutional, and management reforms of the ANSF. These efforts will work towards expanding the ANA as well as to increase the training and capabilities of the ANP. Through these efforts the United States and Coalition partners seek to build a force that is respected by the population, professional, ethnically balanced, accountable, and eventually able to provide security for its own population.

Fortunately, the ISAF and ANSF military campaign has caused setbacks to the Afghan insurgency, including leadership losses and the loss of some key safe havens in Afghanistan. Despite these setbacks, the insurgency has maintained and in some areas increased the scope and pace of its terrorist attacks and



bombings. The increase in insurgent-initiated violence in Afghanistan relates directly to the perceived ineffectiveness of the government, the availability of safe havens in western Pakistan, and increased ISAF presence in former insurgent-controlled areas.

Although security remains fragile in many parts of Afghanistan, the U.S. COIN approach – clear, hold, and build – has successfully demonstrated how combining military and civilian resources can diminish insurgent capacity, maintain security, and link the Afghan people to their government. Wherever the United States and ISAF are able to concentrate forces, development resources, and civilian expertise, tangible security improvements have been made.

Political Achievements

A pivotal element of the COIN strategy is to help build a responsible Afghan government. An effective government serves as the most valuable partner for the United States and international community to maintain security gains, achieve the loyalty of the population, enable continued economic growth and development, and deliver services. Although notable progress has been made, most Afghan ministries lack sufficient administrative capacity necessary for effective program implementation. The United States will continue to pursue a governance assistance strategy that strengthens the GIRoA by building the human capital of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches. The United States provides training and mentoring to Afghan ministries and sub-national governments; provides assistance to improve legal education and build the judicial infrastructure and civil society crucial to the rule of law in Afghanistan; and promotes human rights.

Economic Achievements

Sustained security achievements and accountable governance provide the groundwork for reconstruction and development

efforts to take hold. The Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) are instrumental to these efforts, ensuring coordination among different contributing entities and responsiveness to the needs of the population. In addition, the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) continues to be a critical part of reconstruction and development efforts in Afghanistan. The CERP provides local commanders with the funds and flexibility required to bring needed urgent humanitarian assistance and reconstruction to areas that have been affected by years of conflict and neglect. These resources provide a unique, rapid, high-impact COIN tool that brings immediate benefits to the people of Afghanistan.

The battle against drug traffickers is ongoing and will continue for some time. The GIRoA's own Afghan National Drug Control Strategy (NDCS) establishes the basic framework for counternarcotics success in Afghanistan. The aim of the strategy is to stop current poppy cultivation and trafficking in order to dissuade Afghans from participation in the narco-economy. The United States and international community efforts support the Afghan NDCS.

Success in Afghanistan is vital to America's security. The United States will continue to support the GIRoA, all the while encouraging the Afghan security forces to take a leading role in securing Afghanistan. Continued efforts by the United States will keep Afghanistan from once again becoming a safe haven for the Taliban and Al Qaeda. While the United States is assisting Afghanistan, it must also help the government of Pakistan defeat extremists harboring in the border regions between the two countries. The United States and its Coalition partners will continue to assist Pakistan in defeating extremists, who plan and execute attacks against Coalition forces in Afghanistan and innocent civilians worldwide.


Pakistan

Success in Afghanistan is heavily dependent on Pakistan's ability to deny safe haven for terrorists. Funding a robust COIN capability for Pakistan will serve as a combat multiplier and increase success in OEF. Moreover, extremists in Pakistan threaten the stability of Afghanistan and provide sanctuary for those who plot against the United States homeland. Extremists in Pakistan also threaten the stability of its democratically elected government. Pakistan must have the capability to defeat extremists that threaten the democratic government in Islamabad, our regional partners, and the United States homeland.

The Pakistan military has been engaged in combat operations against extremists along its western border with Afghanistan for several years. Nonetheless, it requires additional resources if it is to ultimately defeat the extremist groups entrenched in the rugged border terrain. The Pakistan Army and other security forces must be re-oriented for a sustained counterinsurgency campaign against extremists.

The Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capabilities Fund (PCCF) will provide the resources required by the Combatant Commander at U.S. Central Command to build the counterinsurgency capacity of the Pakistani security forces. Building more capable military and paramilitary forces is essential to capitalizing on expanded U.S. military presence in Afghanistan.

The PCCF will complement, not replace, existing security assistance and development programs in Pakistan. It will enable Pakistan's security forces to create a secure environment for development initiatives to take root. The PCCF will build the capabilities of the Pakistani security forces to combat extremists, but it is equally important that the United States adequately



resource humanitarian, development, and governance initiatives in Pakistan to ensure there is a comprehensive approach to address the root causes of extremism in Pakistan.


Overseas Contingency Operations Request

JUSTIFICATION

The Department requests \$130.0 billion to support Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) in FY 2010 (Figure 4.2). The request continues to support the President's decisions to both increase forces in Afghanistan and redeploy forces from Iraq for a combined average force level in these two countries of approximately 168,000 in FY 2010.

The request also provides critical force protection requirements; training, equipment, and assistance to U.S. coalition partners; funds to reconstitute equipment lost or stressed by the pace of wartime operations; and intelligence capabilities to enable and enhance the war effort. Detailed justification materials, organized by functional category, are provided in this volume to improve

Figure 4.2 FY10 Overseas Contingency Operations Request: \$130.0B



Numbers may not add due to rounding

understanding of, and increase transparency into, requirements established by the Overseas Contingency Operations.

CONTINUING THE FIGHT

Operations (\$74.1B)

The Operations request will fund the incremental costs of military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq for FY 2010. Operations costs are directly linked to the operating tempo of frontline combat and support forces in theater. This category includes the cost of military operations, family programs, predeployment training, inter- and intra-theater transportation, aircraft flying hours, ship steaming days, and vehicle miles at a wartime operating tempo.

Force Protection (\$15.2B)

Force Protection remains critical to the success of U.S. operations in the Overseas Contingency Operations. In Afghanistan and Iraq, military personnel, rather than military capabilities, are the primary targets of the enemy. This funding will provide an array of body armor, protection equipment, and armored vehicles to protect forces while maintained a high level of mobility and lethality. In particular, this request supports an additional 1,080 lighter All-Terrain MRAP vehicles primarily for OEF, sustainment and maintenance for 16,238 vehicle procured and fielded for use in both Iraq and Afghanistan; fund labor costs associated with increased OEF missions; and perform ballistics and automotive testing.

Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Defeat (\$1.5B)

The IED Defeat request will fund measures to defeat the IED threat to U.S. and Coalition forces in Afghanistan and Iraq throughout FY 2010. Insurgents continue to use IEDs to endanger U.S. and Coalition forces, as IED makers and networks adapt their tactics to target vulnerabilities and

undermine force protection. The persistent use of IEDs by the insurgency warrants continued investment in technologies, equipment, and materials that can be used in the field to defeat these asymmetric weapons.

Military Intelligence (\$4.7B)

The Military Intelligence OCO request funds continuous enhancements of U.S. intelligence capabilities as well as improvements of traditional and non-traditional intelligence operations. Intelligence, counterintelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance activities remain critical to the effective prosecution of the OCO. Adversaries continue to develop resources to counter defense capabilities and erode United States access to vital intelligence. The Military Intelligence category funds continuation of programs in all-source intelligence, counterintelligence, human source intelligence, geospatial intelligence, measurement and signatures intelligence, and signals intelligence.

Afghan National Security Forces (\$7.5B)

The Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) request funds the acceleration of U.S. efforts to build military and police forces capable of conducting independent operations and providing for the long-term security of Afghanistan. With a resurgent Taliban, narco-terrorists, and the persistent threat of al Qaeda, it is a critical priority to continue building the capabilities of the ANSF.

The request also funds the development of the Afghan National Army (ANA), which is growing to an end strength to 134,000 (including some 12,000 soldiers in training, transients, etc), and the continued development of the Afghan National Police (ANP) force, which is growing to an end strength of 86,800. The Department's goal is to complete the growth of the ANA by December 2011. The ANSF funding also provides the associated infrastructure and equipment to enable the ANSF to

expand their capacity. Finally, sustainment funding in the request ensures existing ANSF institutions can continue to support domestic stability inside Afghanistan. The Department also needs Congress to continue to provide needed flexibility by appropriating these funds for 2 year execution through September 30, 2011.

Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund (\$0.7B)

The Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund will provide funding to build the counterinsurgency capabilities of Pakistan's security forces to secure its borders, deny safe haven to violent extremists, and fight insurgents. This support to Pakistan's forces fighting on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border will make Pakistan a more effective partner to U.S. forces in Afghanistan and ultimately contribute to success in this volatile region.

The request for FY 2010 funds a robust counterinsurgency capability for Pakistan to serve as a combat multiplier and increase successes by U.S. forces in the Overseas Contingency Operations.

Coalition Support (\$1.9B)

The Coalition Support request funds the Department's continuing effort to work with or through Coalition partners, thereby reducing the burden on the U.S. Armed Forces. Funding for Coalition Support allows the United States to reimburse cooperating nations and provide lift and sustainment support to partner nations in support of U.S. military operations. The constant participation and commitment of U.S. allies is a critical element of the Overseas Contingency Operations, helping to reduce stress on U.S. forces and increasing the military capacity devoted to counter terrorism. These funds ensure key cooperating nations are reimbursed for their support to U.S. operations; and finance lift and sustain support to coalition forces in Afghanistan and Iraq. The request, is an

increase from FY 2009 requested amounts due to increased reimbursements for the escalation of operations in Pakistan.

Commander's Emergency Response Program (\$1.5B)

The Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) request provides flexible funds for commanders in the field to finance small-scale, urgent civil and humanitarian needs. By enabling projects like the repair of water treatment plants, the creation of irrigation canals, the building of roads, or the reconstruction of power lines, the CERP has proven that it can help U.S. forces garner the trust of local populations and ultimately protect U.S. and Coalition lives. The request provides continued funding for the CERP activities in both Afghanistan and Iraq. The CERP funds will continue to help fund urgent civil and humanitarian relief and reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan as it builds capacity.

Military Construction (\$1.4B)

The Military Construction request provides funding for construction projects in Afghanistan for FY 2010. The request will primarily fund needed infrastructure enhancements associated with the realignment of U.S. forces into and within Afghanistan, both enabling strategic and operational flexibility and increasing Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance capabilities.

RECONSTITUTING THE FORCE (\$17.6B)

The Reconstitution request funds the replenishment, replacement, and repair of equipment used during the Contingency Operations. Funding maintains readiness by replenishing consumables, replacing and repairing weapon systems damaged or destroyed in battle, and upgrading equipment to better address current threats. Without continued investment in Reconstitution, the dynamic pace and extreme environments presented by OEF and OIF would have a

significant, detrimental effect on equipment reliability and warfighting capability. Specifically, this request includes funding to replenish ammunition and missile stocks; replace day-to-day used items and a wide variety of combat support vehicles and aircraft; and provide the necessary depot and intermediate maintenance on equipment returning from Afghanistan and Iraq.

NON-DOD CLASSIFIED (\$3.9B)

Details on this non-DoD classified request will be provided to Congress in a classified annex.



Operations

HIGHLIGHTS


Policy


It is the policy of the Department of Defense to ensure the men and women of the all-volunteer military engaged in the Overseas Contingency Operations are appropriately compensated and have the funds, supplies, and logistical support they need to conduct military operations.

FY 2010 Request: \$74.1B

- Continues to support the President's decision to increase forces in Afghanistan and redeploy forces from Iraq for a combined average force levels in these two countries of approximately 168,000 in FY 2010
- Supports military operations to include: pre-mobilization, mobilization and post-mobilization requirements for reintegration training, medical, and administrative support; inter-and intra-theater transportation; aircraft flying hours; ship steaming days; vehicle and ground miles
- Funds subsistence (food and water) and logistics support; fuel and supply purchases; base and facility support; contract oversight; communications; and organizational maintenance related to military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan
- Funds incremental pay, benefits, and support for military family programs

FY 2010 Overseas Contingency Operations





Numbers may not add due to rounding

Operations	FY	FY 2009 Supplemental			
\$ in Billions	Bridge Enacted	Request	Total	Request	
Pay and Benefits	1.2	14.5	15.7	13.6	
Military Operations	33.6	18.5	52.1	51.9	
Subsistence and Logistics Support	3.4	4.2	7.6	8.2	
Operating and Restocking Supply Depots	_	0.8	0.8	0.4	
Total Operations	38.2	38.0	76.2	74.1	

Numbers may not add due to rounding

DESCRIPTION

The Department of Defense requests \$74.1 billion for military operations in support of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) in FY 2010. This represents a 3 percent decline from the \$76.2 billion needed for FY 2009. Operation costs directly support the operating tempo of frontline combat and support forces in the theater. This request assumes that the FY 2010 combined force levels in Iraq and Afghanistan will average approximately 168,000 troops (100,000 in Iraq and 68,000 in Afghanistan). This is a decrease from the FY 2009 average of 185,000 troops (140,000 in Iraq and 45,000 in Afghanistan). However, conditions on the ground and the commander's assessment could drive the requirement for significant changes in force structure that would compel the Department to request additional funding.

FUNDING REQUEST

The Operations category supports the full spectrum of military personnel, operation and maintenance, supply, and fuel requirements applicable to Reserve Component mobilization, predeployment training, deployment and redeployment of all forces, as well as theater operations and sustainment.

The request sustains daily operations of the estimated FY 2010



U.S. Soldiers of 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division, listen to Sgt. Maj. of the Army Kenneth Preston speak during a visit to Joint Security Station Loyalty, eastern Baghdad, Iraq. Preston discussed issues of interest to the enlisted Soldier, such as changes to the Army noncommissioned officer education system, Army force structure, and the Army's stop-loss policy.

U.S. Army photo by Staff Sgt. James Selesnick - March 2009

average force levels in Iraq of 100,000 and Afghanistan of 68,000. The average force levels reflect the drawdown from Iraq and focus on Afghanistan.

Pay and Benefits

This portion of the Operations request funds:

- Incremental pay and allowances for all deployed military personnel (special pays);
- Subsistence for military personnel;
- Permanent-change-of-station travel;
- Other military personnel costs for mobilizing Reserve component personnel, to include Active Duty for Operational Support (ADOS) uniformed personnel deployed in support of Contingency Operations.

Major requirements are as follows:

Reserve Component Personnel on Active Duty: The force mix needed to support combat operations includes a combination of Active Component units and Reserve Component personnel serving on active duty (mobilized under presidential call-up authority or serving in ADOS status). All basic military pay and entitlements – basic pay, basic allowance for housing and subsistence, retired pay accrual, Social Security contributions, and incentive pay – are incremental to the base budget and supported with supplemental appropriations.

Subsistence: Requested funds provide Subsistence-in-Kind – subsistence for dining facilities, operational rations, and augmentation rations – for all U.S. military forces deployed in support of the Overseas Contingency Operations.

Reserve and National Guard: Funds requested in the military pay appropriations of the Reserve Component provide premobilization training and support.



U.S. Soldiers of the 443rd Transportation Company United States Army Reserves Unit, headquartered in Nebraska, fire MK19 automatic grenade launchers in preparation for their upcoming deployment to Iraq slated for later this year at a range in Camp Atterbury, Ind.,

U.S. Army photo by Spc. John Crosby - March 2009


Active Navy Individual Augmentees: Requested funds provide pay and allowances for 4,400 Active Navy Individual Augmentees who are performing Contingency missions. These Navy personnel retained above the baseline strength profile provide critical augmentation support in capabilities such as Detainee Operations, Civil Affairs, Military Police, Intelligence, Medical Support, and Combat Air Support.

Military Operations

Operation and Maintenance funding for Active, Reserve, and Special Operations forces are required to finance the costs of including military operations transportation, supplies. communications, and fuel consumed in pre-deployment training and in operations in-theater. The FY 2010 overseas contingency operations will require approximately 24.5 million barrels of fuel. Operations funding includes requirements for incremental predeployment training and support, transportation to and from theater, operating tempo in-theater, sustainment of equipment, and the full range of logistics and communications. The Reserve Forces' Operation and Maintenance appropriations fund incremental training and support costs prior to mobilization, and support programs for deployed Reserve forces and their families. Major subcategories of Operation and Maintenance include the following:

Operating Tempo (OPTEMPO): Provides fuel, supplies, repair parts, etc., for combat and supporting forces operating continuously in harsh conditions. The request provides funds for:

- Army OPTEMPO to fund the sustainment of light, mixed, and heavy unit equipment in the full range of combat, combat support, and combat service support units conducting dayto-day operations in support of OEF and OIF. Sustainment includes forward deployment training, air and ground OPTEMPO facility support, and organizational maintenance. The Army incurs both direct and indirect OPTEMPO costs. Direct OPTEMPO costs include fuel, oil, repair parts, etc. Indirect OPTEMPO costs generally include combat training center support, soldier support, training aids, devices, simulators and contracted logistics support.
- Naval Forces to finance the incremental costs of Carrier Strike Groups, Expeditionary Strike Groups, aviation support (Carrier Air Wings and land-based Maritime Patrol and



support aircraft) conducting Maritime Security Operations; Marines conducting the full range of Combat and Counter Insurgency (COIN) operations; and Sailors on the ground providing combat support operations. This includes funding for materials/supplies, training, OPTEMPO (flying, steaming, and operation of ground vehicles), and support to Coalition Forces;

4-13

- Air Force expeditionary operations for the projection of combat air power into OEF and OIF. Flying missions include close air support; air interdiction; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; and both inter- and intra-theater airlift. The expeditionary combat support functions provide mission readiness at forward installations where the Air Force is the lead component. Major mission support programs include airfield and air operations support and security forces, as well as the full range of critical base services including emergency and food services:
- The USSOCOM as the DoD-lead for planning, synchronizing, and, as directed, executing global operations against terrorist networks. Funding supports global Special Operations Forces (SOF) operations. Funds also support USSOCOM headquarters' role as the DoD-lead for planning and synchronizing operations against terrorist networks. The SOF funding also provides for activities designed to counter and defeat terrorism through Unconventional Warfare (UW), Foreign Internal Defense (FID), Psychological Operations, Special Reconnaissance, Information Operations, and Civil Affairs.

Base Support and In-Theater Communications: Provides base operations services, supplies, and equipment; maintenance and storage facilities; pre-deployment training support; and the DoD bases supporting mobilization and deployment missions. Funding supports critical strategic and tactical, in-theater communications infrastructure.

In-Theater Maintenance: Provides for contract labor and repair parts for forward activities that perform maintenance and repair of key systems such as unmanned aircraft, Light Utility Helicopters, missiles and radar, Stryker combat vehicles, High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV) and tank engines, Armored Security Vehicles, and C-130 aircraft.

Transportation: Supports the deployment, sustainment, and redeployment of forces, which includes strategic lift by air, sea, and ground transportation, port-handling operations, and transportation of fallen heroes.

Personnel Support Costs: Provides service members support services such as Military Welfare and Recreation (MWR) services in-theater; Rest and Recuperation (R&R) travel; and civilian special pays.

Yellow Ribbon Reintegration Programs: Provides Reserve Component members and families with information, services, referral, and proactive outreach opportunities throughout the entire deployment cycle.

Guantanamo Bay Detainee Relocation: This provides the Secretary with funding to support the relocation and disposition of individuals detained at the base, the relocation of military and support forces associated with detainee operations, and the closure of detainee facilities. In the Executive Order signed January 22, 2009, the President directs the closure of the detention facilities at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base no later than one year from the date of the order. Also funds the Office of Military Commission Review.

Services and Related Support: Provides for the Defense Agencies to support Contingency Operations activities such as contract management and in-theater audit services; secure credentials; personnel and support costs for military trials; rewards for information provided by local nationals; emergency childcare, family counseling, coalition support, and classified activities.

Subsistence and Logistics Support

Provides for the cost of in-theater logistics support (e.g., operations of the forward operating bases for deployed troops) and subsistence and associated transportation costs for authorized civilians and contractors.

 Theater Base Camp and Logistics Support: Includes Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) base camp and life support services – power generation, facilities management, billeting, dining services, latrines and waste management – at sites in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Kuwait. The FY 2010 request reflects ongoing transition to Phase IV of the LOGCAP contract that moves from a single vendor to multiple vendors.

Operating and Restocking Supply Depots

Funds are required for the Defense Working Capital Fund to support Overseas Contingency Operations to include, the Kuwait in-theater consolidated shipping point, distribution function, logistics information systems support, and demilitarization operating costs within the Area of Responsibility (AOR). Funds are also required to pay the cost of in-theater transportation, delivery, and storage of fuel, plus the cost to replenish combat fuel losses experienced at tactical fuel sites and along fuel delivery routes.

SUMMARY

The request for FY 2010 is required to support the President's plans to increase troop levels in Afghanistan and redeploy forces from Iraq. Without these funds, the Military Services will have to reduce the level of military operations, which would prevent U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan and Iraq, from achieving their objectives, weakening future warfighting capabilities, and ultimately undermine U.S. security.



U.S. Navy Lts. Evan D. Reese and Jessica E. Caldwell, both pilots from Fleet Logistics Support Squadron 30, Detachment 4, speak with maintainers and aircraft mechanics before a flight mission to USS John C. Stennis (CVN 74) in the Pacific Ocean to deliver supplies and gear on a C-2A Greyhound, from Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni, Japan. The C-2A Greyhound is a twin-engine cargo aircraft designed specifically for its primary mission, carrier on-board delivery.

U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. Jacqueline Diaz – March 2009

Force Protection

HIGHLIGHTS


Policy

It is the policy of the Department of Defense to provide U.S. Armed Forces with the best protection and the most effective technology against all forms of hostile action.

FY 2010 Request: \$15.2B


- Body armor and other personal protection items
- Equipment
 - Aircraft survivability components
 - Command and Control equipment
 - Radios
 - Night vision equipment
- Armored vehicles and High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) Fragmentation Kits
- Continued support for body armor, protection equipment, and armored vehicles
- Lighter Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (LMRAP) vehicles and All Terrain Vehicles (ATV) for OEF missions
- Labor costs for mechanics and logisticians supporting OEF missions

FY 2010 Overseas Contingency Operations



Total Annual Cost

\$ in Billions



^{*} Includes \$16.8B MRAP appropriation

Numbers may not add due to rounding

Force Protection	FY	FY 2009 Supplemental			
\$ in Billions	Bridge Enacted	Request	Total	Request	
Body Armor and Protective Gear	1.1	0.9	2.0	1.3	
Protection Equipment	1.5	4.5	6.0	8.4	
Armored Vehicles (includes MRAP)	1.9	4.4	6.3	5.5	
Total Force Protection	4.5	9.8	14.3	15.2	
Numbers may not add due to rounding	1	ı	ı		

DESCRIPTION

The Department of Defense requests \$15.2 billion for force protection efforts in FY 2010. This represents an approximate 6 percent increase from the \$14.3 billion appropriated and requested for FY 2009. The Department's FY 2010 total request of \$15.2 billion includes \$5.5 billion for the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicle program. This request supports an additional 1,080 lighter All-Terrain MRAP vehicles for OEF, sustainment and maintenance for 16,238 vehicle procured and fielded for both OIF and OEF, labor costs for mechanics and logisticians supporting OIF and OEF, and ballistics and automotive testing.

The Department is committed to ensuring that U.S. forces are provided with the best force protection equipment possible to deter and defend against asymmetric threats. The most direct and visible method to increase force protection is to enhance personnel protective armor, provide the most effective force protection equipment, and improve the armoring on vehicles. Funds utilized for force protection directly impact the Department's ability to save lives and increase the operational effectiveness of U.S. troops on the ground and others involved in combat.

FUNDING REQUEST

The \$15.2 billion FY 2010 request supports the procurement of protective measures against attacks on U.S. troops and civilians



U.S. Army Spc. Kevin Wells, a psychological operations specialist, attached to Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 315th Psychological Operational Group, watches traffic, from the turret, of an ambush protected-mine resistant vehicle, in the Rashid district, of Baghdad, Iraq.

U.S. Army photo by Sgt. Gustavo Olgiati - March 2009

in Afghanistan and Iraq. These measures include an array of specialized equipment intended to protect forces while maintaining a high level of force mobility and lethality.

Body Armor

Individual Body Armor (IBA): The IBA provides an increased level of protection for forces on the ground and in the air. The Department is purchasing next generation body armor systems to take advantage of the most effective technology.

Body armor is purchased in both individual sets and replacement parts and components (Figure 4.3). Body armor requirements have evolved from an initial basic vest with chest and back protection in FY 2004 (Outer Tactical Vest) combined with two rifle plates called Small Arms Protective Inserts (SAPI). These were improved with Enhanced Small Arms Protective Inserts (E-SAPI). Also added were side, leg, and neck protection (Deltoid Auxiliary Protection System), which provides

additional shoulder protection and protection against armorpiercing rounds. This level of body armor protection is the minimum protective level for combat operations. It is worn to stop small arms and shrapnel. The Department started transitioning certain service members to the next generation Small Arms Protective Inserts (X-SAPI). This improvement includes protection against armor piercing ammunition.

Through FY 2008, the Department procured 100 percent of its requirements for Active, Reserve and National Guard units. Since that time, additional quantities have been procured as whole sets and component replacements with enhanced body armor and components, such as Improved Outer Tactical Vest (IOTV-a major Body Armor component). In FY 2010, body armor purchases (both E-SAPI and X-SAPI) maintain the required quantities for deployed forces. These purchases replace body armor set losses due to combat or other actions, as well as integrate the latest technological advances in body

	Army	Navy	Marines	Air Force	SOCOM	Total
FY 2004 through FY 2007 Purchases	1,104,097	18,275	102,306	156,523	43,532	1,424,733
FY 2008 Baseline	_	_	_	_	9,875	9,875
FY 2008 Contingency Bridge	200,000	5,700	800	45,000	_	251,500
FY 2008 Contingency Remaining Supplemental	70,000		_	_	3,200	73,200
Cumulative Totals FY 2004 - 2008	1,374,097	23,975	103,106	201,523	56,607	1,759,308
FY 2009 Baseline		_	5,210	_	4,353	9,563
FY 2009 Contingency Bridge Enacted	120,000	6,178	14,317	_	_	140,495
FY 2009 Contingency Supplemental Request	_	2,251	29,713	19,200	_	51,164
FY 2009 Total	120,000	8,429	49,240	19,200	4,353	201,222
FY 2010 Baseline		400	10,180		2,151	12,731
FY 2010 Overseas Contingency Operation Request	120,000	9,120	27,200	19,900		176,220
FY 2010 Total	120,000	9,520	37,380	19,900	2,151	188,951
Grand Totals FY 2004 - 2010	1,614,097	41,924	189,726	240,623	63,111	2,149,481

armor components into forward units. Additionally, efforts are underway to improve the fidelity of E-SAPI serviceability inspections by X-raying the ceramic-based composite plates. This provides improved confidence level that allows the prediction of stable sustainment percentages.

In addition, there are other personal protection items not specifically labeled as body armor such as helmets (including the new Advanced Combat Helmet (ACH)), earplugs, gloves, boots, and other items. This makes it difficult to make year-to-year comparisons on how many "sets" of body armor are procured each year. Figure 4.3 reflects the total whole sets of individual body armor and replacement parts.

Advanced Combat Helmets (ACH) to Aircrew and Ground support personnel: The ACH outperforms the Personnel Armor System, Ground Troops (PASGT) Kevlar helmet in survivability and injury avoidance. The ACH has better ballistic and impact protection, increased 9mm and 7.62mm bullet protection, and improved field of vision and localization.

Protection Equipment and Activities

Fire-resistant combat uniforms for protection against fuel-enhanced Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs): Fire-retardant "Nomex" uniforms are designed to protect soldiers from fuel-based accelerants used in conjunction with IEDs. The fuel-based IEDs are inflicting serious burns to gunners and operators of tactical vehicles. The Nomex fabric provides protection up to 700 degrees Fahrenheit. Nomex adds an additional two to four seconds of fire protection for vehicle egress. The request will enable the Army to continue to provide gunners with two sets of uniforms, gloves, and a balaclava-type hood. The complete uniform ensemble will include Combat Vehicle Crewmember Coveralls, Gloves, and Balaclava Hoods.

Newly fielded combat uniforms for desert warfare operations: The request provides Army Combat Uniforms (ACU) for deployers in support of OIF and OEF. Improved uniform capabilities include better camouflage and improved performance for desert warfare operations.

Asymmetric Warfare Group (AWG): The Army's AWG mission is to study and provide recommendations to commanders on the ground for the neutralization and defeat of IEDs and other insurgent tactics that harm U.S. and Coalition forces. The organization is actively engaged in real-time assessment and quick response solutions, and coordinates closely with the IED Defeat Organization.

Rapid Equipping Force (REF): The REF bridges the gap between the lengthy acquisition process and immediate warfighter needs. Specifically, the REF mission is to:

- Equip operational commanders with off-the-shelf (government or commercial) solutions or near-term developmental items that can be researched, developed, and acquired quickly – ideally, within 90 days;
- Insert future force technology solutions that engaged and deploying forces require by developing, testing, and evaluating key technologies and systems under operational conditions;
- Assess capabilities and advise Army stakeholders of findings that will enable forces to rapidly confront an adaptive enemy.

Rapid Fielding Initiative (RFI): The RFI leverages current programs and provides commercial-off-the-shelf equipment to soldiers such as helmets, clothing items, and hydration systems. This technology gives the soldier increased survivability, lethality, and mobility capabilities.

Communication and Electronic Equipment: The request for Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I) technology will enable information dominance and decisive lethality for the networked warfighter.


- Communications: Funding would provide for Command and Control systems such as Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2) to increase situational awareness at the lowest tactical level. Knight Command and Control provides precision strike capability by accurately locating and designating targets for both ground and airdelivered laser-guided ordnance and conventional munitions. Funds also provide information systems, tactical operations centers, and vehicle tracking systems.
- Electronic equipment: Funding would provide for electronic equipment such as Warlock and CREW II, which are IED jamming devices that attempt to intercept or block a signal before it reaches its intended target, preventing detonation. Lightweight Counter Mortar Radar tracks and detects enemy mortar fire, and the Sequoyah language translator for one or two-way speech translation. Funding for night vision devices would improve situational awareness by providing the capability to rapidly detect and recognize targets, while simultaneously maintaining the ability to see details and to use rifle mounted aiming lights. Night vision provides soldiers the ability to engage and execute close combat operations and can perform in all levels of light, environments, and weather conditions. Lightweight Laser Designator Rangefinder (LLDR) enables fire support teams and forward observers to observe and accurately locate targets, digitally transmit target location data to the tactical network, and laser-designate high priority targets for destruction by precision munitions.

Biometrics: Funds for biometrics would enable verification of an individual's identity. Biometrics can deny an adversary the

ability to hide their true identity by stripping away anonymity with swift, accurate, and definitive identity verification.

Aircraft Survivability Equipment: The request funds investments in equipment to increase the survival of personnel and equipment to include missile warning systems, aircraft countermeasure systems, dispensers, and infrared suppression systems.

Mine-Clearance Equipment: The request funds the procurement of Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) equipment, the Self Protection Adaptive Roller Kit (SPARK) mine roller kit, which will be fitted to tactical vehicles such as the MRAP and High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV) to counter explosive threats.



gasoline-powered Micro Air Vehicle (gMAV): The request funds the procurement of the gMAV, which provides the dismounted soldier Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (RSTA). The gMAV can hover while its sensor platform can take still and video imagery, which provides key intelligence for precision targeting and surveillance operations.

Weapon Systems: Funds will continue procurement of counter-rocket/artillery and mortar (C-RAM) radars, which are critical to protecting Soldiers from cannon, rocket and mortar fire. The funding will also continue to be used to purchase howitzers, small arms, non-lethal weapons, and vehicle mounted weapons stations that can be remotely operated within vehicles such as HMMWVs.

- Counter-Rocket, Artillery and Mortar (C-RAM): Funding would procure the C-RAM air defense weapon system. The request enables the Army to detect rocket, artillery and mortar threats; warn the defended area; and intercept rounds in flight preventing damage to ground forces or facilities.
- Small Arms: Funds will continue procurement and modification of various individual and crew-served weapons such as the M240 Medium Machine Gun, and .50 caliber machine gun modifications and special rifle mounted optics to enable soldiers and marines to conduct combat operations and engage targets with lethal fire.
- Common Remotely Operated Weapon Station (CROWS): Funding would procure CROWS, which is a vehicle mounted weapons station that enables soldiers to remotely operate various types of automatic weapons and machine guns while under armor protection from within their vehicle.

Light Armored Vehicle (LAV) Upgrades: The LAV is a light armored combat, combat support, and combat service support vehicles. Funding will upgrade the armor and armament, along with survivability and capability enhancements.

High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWVs): Funds would provide for the procurement of HMMWVs destroyed, damaged, or worn out due to combat operations. The HMMWV has several configurations such as cargo carrier, troop carrier, armament carrier, ambulance, and shelter carrier.

Armored Vehicles

The request funds the procurement of armored vehicles. Armored vehicles procurement includes MRAP vehicles; Mine Detection Vehicles that enable detection, protection, and early reaction to explosive hazards while on the move assuring mobility of the force; armored security vehicles and upgrades for the Bradley Fighting Vehicle and M1 Abrams Tank.

• MRAP Vehicles: Procure an additional 1,080 MRAP light all-terrain vehicles to fill an urgent in-theater need for OEF activities and continue production of selected MRAP vehicles at minimum levels. This request also includes funding to provide logistics support to MRAP vehicles such as repair parts; labor associated with vehicle and component repair in Kuwait, OEF, and OIF; and support of increased air transportation of vehicles. Sustainment costs for MRAP vehicles include maintenance personnel, in-theater facilities, training, repairable and consumable parts. Sustainment costs are driven mostly by an estimated 7,000 miles per year per MRAP vehicle OPTEMPO and a more distributed intheater maintenance and support strategy.

SUMMARY

Force Protection is essential for ensuring the safety and security of U.S. troops. Without these funds – and the most effective body armor and protective equipment available – U.S. soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen will be placed unnecessarily in harm's way.

Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Defeat

HIGHLIGHTS


Policy


It is the policy of the Department of Defense to defeat IEDs as the enemy's weapon of choice by attacking the IED network, defeating the device, and training our forces to detect, neutralize and mitigate these weapons of strategic influence.

FY 2010 Request: \$1.5B

- Attack the Network
 - Joint Urgent Operational Need (JUON) Response
 - Information Fusion
 - Non-JUON Initiative Development
- Defeat the Device
 - Joint Urgent Operational Need (JUON) Response
 - Test Environment
 - Non-JUON Initiative Development
- Train the Force
 - Counter-IED Training

FY 2010 Overseas Contingency Operations





■ Previously Appropriated FY09 Remaining Request

FY 2009

\$0

FY10 Request

FY 2010

Numbers may not add due to rounding

IED Defeat	FY 2009 Supplemental			FY 2010
\$ in Billions	Bridge Enacted	Request	Total	Request
Attack the Network	0.7	0.5	1.2	0.8
Defeat the Device	1.0	0.6	1.6	0.5
Train the Force	0.3	0.3	0.6	0.2
Staff and Infrastructure	0.1	<0.1	0.1	-
Total IED Defeat	2.0	1.5	3.5	1.5


Numbers may not add due to rounding

DESCRIPTION

The Department of Defense requests \$1.5 billion in FY 2010 to defeat Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) as weapons of strategic influence, a 57 percent decrease from the FY 2009 total of \$3.5 billion. The FY 2010 IED funding request is split between the base budget (\$0.6 billion) and OCO request (\$1.5 billion) to institutionalize counter-IED capabilities. The FY 2010 OCO request also reflects a declining number of warfighting generated Joint Urgent Operational needs (JUONS).

The IEDs are easy to produce, inexpensive and effective, and they remain a persistent, asymmetric threat to Joint and Coalition Forces in Afghanistan and Iraq. The enemy continues to evolve and adapt IEDs in response to effective countermeasures, developing IEDs that are even more sophisticated at a faster pace. Consequently, the IED will be a pervasive, inseparable component of the asymmetric threat posed by insurgent and terrorist networks.

To address comprehensively this critical threat, the Department established the Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) in February 2006 to develop, procure, and field Counter-IED (C-IED) technology as quickly as possible. The organization has produced significant successes and continued congressional



support will ensure that deployed U.S. forces have the best protection against the deadly IED threat.

The funding requested for IED defeat supports the following Lines of Operation:

- Attack the Network;
- Defeat the Device; and
- Train the Force.

FUNDING REQUEST

The FY 2010 request would fund actions against all components of the IED network – the IED manufacturers, the trainers, and the supporting infrastructures. The request will help to counter IED threats against U.S. Forces.

Attack the Network

The Department requests \$0.8 billion in FY 2010 Overseas Contingency Operations funding to enhance the warfighter's capabilities to attack and disrupt the enemy's IED networks. By identifying and exploiting IED network vulnerabilities, the JIEDDO enables offensive operations that disrupt the enemy's innovation cycle. The JIEDDO develops, procures, integrates and sustains new technologies and tools for modeling and simulation; fuses information; and provides operationally integrated products to theater-deployed forces that capitalize on synergies from offensive operations. The JIEDDO makes the resulting C-IED capabilities available to the warfighter at the required tactical levels to meet their requirement for planning and execution. Critical items include the following:

 Joint Urgent Operational Need (JUON) Response: Addresses emerging, immediate needs identified by Combatant Commanders and their respective Joint Task Forces that are considered life- or combat missionthreatening. The JIEDDO rapidly acquires systems and develops capabilities in response to unforeseen capability gaps, normally deploying potential C-IED solutions to the warfighter in 4 to 24 months. The JUON budget estimate for FY 2010 is derived from historical experience as well as current trends and anticipated needs.

- Information Fusion: Leverages existing information, forensic analyses, technology and collaboration to provide real-time, tactical information to the warfighter that enables more precise attacks against enemy IED networks.
- Non-JUON Initiative Development: Funds strategic
 investments that capitalize on opportunities to deploy C-IED
 non-materiel solutions outside of the JUON process. These
 initiatives focus on technologies aimed at disrupting IED
 networks (e.g., financiers, bomb makers, trainers, etc.).

Defeat the Device

The Department requests \$0.5 billion in FY 2010 Overseas Contingency Operations funding for initiatives designed to thwart the impact of IEDs after they are emplaced, including technologies that assist in detecting IEDs from greater distances, mitigating blast effects, protecting against blast injuries, and safely disarming or detonating IEDs before enemy activation. The JIEDDO identifies, develops, acquires, and fields technology to Combatant Commanders to find IEDs and defeat them at the point of attack, thereby lowering casualties and enhancing commanders' freedom of action.

 JUON Response: As is the case with Attack the Network, this funding permits a rapid response to emerging, warfighter-generated requirements. These efforts include initiatives to detect and neutralize a wide range of devices such as radio-controlled, deep-buried underbelly, pressureplate initiated and personnel/vehicle-borne IEDs.

- Test Environment: Coordinates and synchronizes test and evaluation (T&E) resources to ensure that all systems are adequately tested and evaluated in an environment that mirrors the theater in which they will be operated. Allows for the development of T&E protocols and standards and the coordination of operational assessments.
- Initiative Development: Funds strategic investments in technologies aimed at detecting, neutralizing and mitigating IEDs.

Train the Force

The Department requests \$0.2 billion in FY 2010 Overseas Contingency Operations funding to prepare units prior to and during deployment for operations in an intense, fluid IED environment. The JIEDDO-sponsored initiatives will facilitate individual and collective training, provide critical C-IED surrogate equipment necessary to ensure that Joint Forces receive realistic C-IED training prior to deployment, and will fuse IED Defeat training efforts across the Services in an integrated approach that supports a joint operating environment.

Counter-IED Training: Ensures that deploying warfighters are trained against the most current threat using proven tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) tailored to their specific theaters of operation. Ensures that deployed and deploying forces are proficient in the use of the newest C-IED equipment and methods including route reconnaissance and clearance, C-IED robotics, predictive analysis tools, weapons intelligence teams, biometrics, and tactical site exploitation. Closes C-IED training gaps that the Services cannot address on short-notice, including advanced technical training. Provides for the purchase, distribution and fielding, and sustainment of surrogate equipment used



U.S. Army Spc. Josh Doerr, from 223rd Military Police Company, Kentucky National Guard, scans for snipers, improvised explosive devices and suspicious activity, from his gunner's position, in an M1151 HMMWV, in Zoba Iraq. Doerr is on his second deployment in Iraq.

U.S. Army photo by Sgt. Edwin M. Bridges - October 2008

to support multiple Services' training venues around the world, including training aids used in combat theaters.

SUMMARY

The Overseas Contingency Operations request of \$1.5 billion covers planned FY 2010 initiatives and emerging Joint Urgent Operating Needs identified by Combatant Commanders and their respective Joint Task Forces, who are required to defeat IEDs and protect U.S. troops against the quickly evolving, asymmetrical threats that have proven to be the single most effective weapon against deployed forces.

Military Intelligence

HIGHLIGHTS


Policy

It is the policy of the Department of Defense to support warfighting units with timely, accurate, and comprehensive intelligence.

FY 2010 Request: \$4.7B


- Airborne Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR)
- All-Source Intelligence
- Human Derived Information
- Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT)
- Measurement and Signatures Intelligence (MASINT)
- Multidisciplinary Intelligence
- Operational Support
- Signals Intelligence (SIGINT)

FY 2010 Overseas Contingency Operations





\$ in Billions



Military Intelligence	FY 2009 Supplemental			FY 2010	
\$ in Billions	Bridge Enacted	Request	Total	Request	
Military Intelligence Program	1.4	3.8	5.1	4.7	

Numbers may not add due to rounding

DESCRIPTION

The Department of Defense requests \$4.7 billion for Military Intelligence Programs (MIP) vital to the conduct of operations in the Overseas Contingency Operations. This represents an 8 percent decline from the FY 2009 requirement of \$5.1 billion.


FUNDING REQUEST

The Department's request is critical to providing deployed units and next-to-deploy units with access to real-time, operationally focused intelligence. The MIP request is provided in the following intelligence disciplines:

- Airborne Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR);
- All-Source Intelligence;
- · Human Derived Information;
- Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT);
- Measurement and Signatures Intelligence (MASINT);
- Multidisciplinary Intelligence;
- Operational Support;
- Signals Intelligence (SIGINT)

Airborne ISR

The Airborne ISR discipline includes activities that synchronize and integrate the planning and operation of airborne sensors, assets and processing, exploitation, and dissemination systems in direct support of current and future operations. The Airborne



ISR provides a diverse set of "multi-INT" capabilities and reachback support for Combatant Commands (COCOMs) engaged in the Overseas Contingency Operations, particularly U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). Airborne ISR is an integrated intelligence and operations function. The MIP request would fund procurement of and modifications to platforms such as the Warrior (MQ-1C aircraft and ground stations), Constant Hawk, and Air Force SENIOR SCOUT to provide critical capabilities to the forces engaged in OEF and OIF.

The MIP request would also fund logistical support to unmanned aerial systems, such as Broad Area Maritime Surveillance Demonstrator (BAMS-D), and Saber Focus, which will provide persistent ISR capabilities.

Additionally, this request would add Predator data link upgrades to mitigate in-theater C-band congestion, increase video quality, and improve interoperability. In addition, the Air Force MIP request includes Global Hawk transportable aircraft shelters to accommodate the deployment of Block 20/30/40 aircraft that are larger than the current shelters.

The Air Force request includes funding to procure additional Wide Area Airborne Surveillance (WAAS) sensors that provide persistent, broad area motion imagery to combat IEDs and insurgent activities. It also would sustain ISR operations through contractor logistics support. The ISR assets, including U-2 aircraft, Global Hawk, Predator, RJ-135, and Distributed Command Ground/Surface System (DCGS), provide critical intelligence collection and Processing, Exploitation & Dissemination (PED) function for combat operations in both OEF and OIF. These Air Force MIP ISR capabilities ensure warfighters have the real-time (or near-real-time) sensitive targeting, force protection (to include counter-IED), threat warning, and overall situational awareness they need, and directly improve joint warfighters' and operational commanders' combat effectiveness.

All-Source Intelligence

The All-Source Intelligence discipline funds activities that support the production of finished intelligence products by incorporating all sources of intelligence, to include human, signals, and imagery. The MIP request would fund efforts across the Services and Agencies, but particularly at the Combatant Commands (part of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) request). It provides Human Terrain Teams and Social Science Research and Analysis efforts for both OEF and OIF. These funds primarily support contracted analytic efforts and related OPTEMPO to enable 24/7 support of operations around the world.

Human Derived Information

The Human Derived Information (HDI) includes identification and tracking of activities related to conducting and supporting collection of information by and through humans (formerly Counterintelligence and HUMINT).

In particular, the request would fund force protection efforts in the Services and DIA, in-theater CI analysis and operations, as well as CI training for deploying forces. The request would fund a broad array of CI capabilities and projects in direct support of deployed forces, like CI Support to Combatant Commands and Defense Agencies (CICODA), to provide direct CI analysis and production support to the Combatant Commands, Military Services, and Defense Agencies worldwide. It would provide near-real-time intelligence and analytic support to protect DoD and other U.S. Government personnel, dependents, and assets against terrorist attacks and exploitation by foreign intelligence services. The CI support to critical information infrastructure provides hardware and software upgrades and the contractors to conduct cyber CI activities targeting foreign terrorists, organizations, and insurgents that represent a threat to DoD and other U.S. Government interests. The CI support to technical services responds to Overseas Contingency Operations

requirements for CI technical services and Technical Surveillance Countermeasures (TSCM) capabilities. These funds would support contracted efforts to sustain CI operations and training, as well as some equipment purchases to enable information sharing across components engaged in CI activities.

The HDI also includes intelligence information collected from and provided by human sources. The MIP request supports the evolution of the CI and HUMINT architectures (hardware, communications, training, and software), integrates standardized operational systems, and identifies technical requirements for the future force. These efforts are underway in the Army and



U.S. Navy Aviation Ordnanceman 2nd Class Marie Fentress affixes a GBU-12 laser-guided bomb to the wing of an F/A-18A+ Hornet aircraft on the flight deck of aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71), under way in the Pacific Ocean. The ship and embarked Carrier Air Wing (CVW) 8 are operating in the U.S. 5th Fleet area of responsibility.

U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Spc 3rd Class Antwjuan Richards-Jamison - February 2009

DIA. The Army portion of this request would sustain contract support to develop and revise CI/HUMINT doctrine for CI source operations, TSCM, polygraph support, biometrics, Offensive Foreign Counter-intelligence Operations, and the management and operation of the Army CI Case Control Office and the Theater Sub-Case Control Offices.

Additionally, the request would continue to support HUMINT training, contract instructors, and support personnel to produce 35M HUMINT Collectors and 35LCI Agents at the Joint Intelligence Combat Training Center (JI-CTC), as well as automated classroom support to produce functional and leader development training as well as capabilities development.

Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT)

The GEOINT discipline refers to the exploitation and analysis of imagery and geospatial information to describe, assess, and visually depict physical features and geographically referenced activities on earth. The GEOINT consists of imagery, imagery intelligence, and geospatial information. The MIP funds GEOINT efforts primarily through National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), which allow warfighters to "see" the battlefield, an essential capability for combating terrorism and providing quality mission planning information in the theater. The NGA MIP request would support the procurement and operation of mobile, deployable exploitation tools as well as contracted support to enable effective and timely access of GEOINT by the forces on the ground. In particular, the request would support imagery exploitation workstations, and training for Full Motion Video (FMV) intelligence exploitation units.

Measurement and Signatures Intelligence (MASINT)

The MASINT discipline is technically derived intelligence that detects, locates, tracks, identifies, and describes the unique characteristics of fixed and dynamic target sources. The

MASINT capabilities include radar, laser, optical, infrared, acoustic, nuclear radiation, radio frequency, spectroradiometric, and seismic sensing systems as well as gas, liquid, and solid materials sampling and analysis. The MASINT provides insights into the areas of operation in Afghanistan and Iraq that other intelligence sensors cannot. The Department's request would support force protection, counter-targeting, persistent surveillance, and the reduction of combat risk by funding sensors, sustaining their operation, and providing warfighters with the tools to access and utilize the sensor data collected in the field. The request would also support maintenance, spare parts, repairs, and sustainment of older systems, critical for maintaining continuity for the war effort and ensuring no production breaks for critical equipping of sensor systems.

Multidisciplinary Intelligence

The Multidisciplinary Intelligence discipline refers to the collection and processing of information by two or more disciplines. The MIP request would fund the procurement and sustainment of platforms and systems such as the Shadow UAV in the Army and Distributed Common Ground/Surface System (DCGS) ISR Processing, Exploitation & Dissemination (PED) functions. In addition, the Air Force DCGS provided multi-INT tasking, collection, processing, exploitation, dissemination, and correlation operations support for over 3,800 U-2 aircraft, Global Hawk, and Predator sorties in recent missions.

Operational Support

The Operational Support discipline funds those activities that provide general, financial, and administrative functions, including logistics, comptroller, legal and audit functions, personnel management, facilities costs, development activities, public information, medical services, supply operations, base services, and property disposal. This request would sustain 24/7 intelligence staff support at critical operational locations, IT

infrastructure support, and some training infrastructure, particularly for the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps.

The MIP request would fund efforts throughout all Components to provide deploying forces, as well as deployed forces, with training in intelligence collection, exploitation and analysis, as well as utilization of equipment in the field.

Signals Intelligence (SIGINT)

The SIGINT discipline is comprised of communications intelligence, electronic intelligence, and foreign instrumentation signals intelligence, however transmitted. The SIGINT provides force protection and indications and warning products in support of deployed forces in the theater, followed by target development, analysis and reporting of logistics, support, and recruitment networks. The MIP request would fund equipment and operations, primarily in the Army, Marine Corps, Air Force, and National Security Agency (NSA), to equip forces with systems such as TROJAN and Prophet, to allow them to apply the collected information to ongoing operations. The TROJAN Data Network facilitates all-source analysis and SCI reach back



for warfighters in support of OEF/OIF. The TROJAN Classic XXI capability provides unmanned SIGINT systems in forward deployed locations, providing actionable intelligence to Combatant Commanders in particular. The MIP request would provide IT personnel support to users worldwide at the TROJAN Network Control centers, supporting approximately 400 sites worldwide. The request would also provide operational management and oversight of TROJAN systems, to include firewalls, router password management, internet protocol address space, network scanning and patching, and TROJAN Bandwidth Available Upon Demand assignments. The request would also fund training and target familiarization to forces deploying to Afghanistan, Iraq, and Africa.

SUMMARY

Without these funds, the Department will be unable to conduct essential surveillance against high value and high interest targets in Afghanistan and Iraq with the frequency and effectiveness required by U.S. warfighters. For example, intelligence collection on – and therefore detection of – IEDs will be reduced, leading to more deaths of and injuries to U.S. forces in-theater. Similarly, curtailed maintenance or sustainment of critical theater-level collection systems, such as UAVs, will threaten the safety and effectiveness of U.S. forces. The MIP capabilities supported in this request are essential to the timely, effective, and targeted operations U.S. and Coalition forces conduct every day.



U.S. Navy Chief Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Technician Kenneth Simpson, assigned to Joint Special Operations Task Force Philippines EOD task unit, and members of Philippine Army EOD Battalion, 3rd EOD Detachment, examine the blast site after the successful explosion of a simulated improvised explosive device during a subject matter expert exchange in Zamboanga City, Philippines. The U.S. EOD task force continually assists Philippine security forces by sharing information and technical assistance.

U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Aaron Burden - April 2009

Afghan National Security Forces

HIGHLIGHTS


Policy

It is the policy of the United States to develop the capabilities of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) to conduct independent counterinsurgency (COIN) operations and establish security throughout Afghanistan.

FY 2010 Request: \$7.5B


- Continues building the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police
- Funds the accelerated growth of the Afghan National Army to an end strength of 134,000 soldiers in 2011
- Continues support to man, train, and equip 86,800 Afghan National Police

FY 2010 Overseas Contingency Operations



Total Annual Cost

\$ in Billions



Numbers may not add due to rounding

Afghan National Security Forces	FY	FY 2010		
\$ in Billions	Bridge Enacted*	Request**	Total	Request
Ministry of Defense				
Infrastructure	0.3	0.4	0.8	0.9
Equipment and Transportation	0.5	1.2	1.7	1.6
Training and Operations	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.3
Sustainment	0.6	0.8	1.3	1.9
Total Ministry of Defense	1.5	2.6	4.0	4.7
Ministry of Interior				
Infrastructure	<0.1	0.3	0.3	0.0
Equipment and Transportation	<0.1	<0.1	0.1	0.3
Training and Operations	0.2	0.3	0.5	0.0
Sustainment	0.2	0.4	0.6	1.2
Total Ministry of Interior	0.5	1.0	1.5	2.8
Related Activities	_	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1
Total Afghan National Security Forces	2.0	3.6	5.6	7.5

^{*} Bridge Enacted reflects approved spend plan. Numbers may not add due to rounding

DESCRIPTION

The Department of Defense requests \$7.5 billion to support Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) for FY 2010. This represents an increase of 34 percent above the FY 2009 level of \$5.6 billion. The Department also requests Congress continue to provide needed flexibility by appropriating these funds for two-year execution through September 30, 2011.

The FY 2010 budget provides essential resources to maintain the accelerated growth of the Afghan National Army (ANA) force structure to a goal of 134,000 (122,000 trained and 12,000 soldiers in training) by December 2011 and to continue training and supporting the 86,800 Afghan National Police (ANP)



Atghan National Police officers and U.S. Marines with Company I, 3rd Battalion, 8th Marine Regiment maintain security during a cordon and search mission in a village in Farah province, Afghanistan. The two units are searching for enemy activity in their areas of operation. The 3rd Battalion is the ground combat element of Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force - Afghanistan.

U.S. Air Force photo by Val Gempis - November 2008

^{**} Request includes legislation to cancel and reappropriate \$0.1B of the \$2.0B Bridge funding and make it available until September 30, 2010

force. The FY 2010 budget provides resources to increase the capability of ANSF combat and police units and associated infrastructure and equipment to reduce and eventually eliminate dependence on Coalition forces.

FUNDING REQUEST

The FY 2010 OCO budget supports the expanded ANSF with independent capabilities to secure Afghanistan and prevent it from becoming a haven for international terrorism and associated militant extremist movements. The request continues the acceleration plan initiated with the FY 2009 OCO supplemental, expands training and professionalization of the police force, sustains those forces, and provides equipment and supporting infrastructure.



U.S. Marine Corps Lt. Col. David L. Odom, commanding officer, 3rd Battalion, 8th Marine Regiment, points to an area and states his intentions to one of his Marines, in Delaram, Farah, Afghanistan. Odom and his Marines have partnered with the Afghan National Police to provide security to Delaram citizens. Odom is the commanding officer of the ground combat element for the Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force-Afghanistan.

U.S. Marine Corps photo by Chief Warrant Officer Philippe Chasse - March 2009

The ANSF are steadily growing in strength and capability. The FY 2010 Overseas Contingency Operation budget will support growth to approximately 97,000 ANA soldiers (plus 10,000 students) and over 86,800 ANP trained and equipped. Enabling these forces to provide for the security of their own nation is central to the success of OEF and the long-term stability of Afghanistan.

Despite the considerable achievements and growth in international community support since the start of OEF, security threats remain a major impediment to development, and the environment continues to be fluid, demanding continual reexamination of the strategy.

In response to the changing security environment, the Department requested funding to support acceleration of the military force expansion in the FY 2009 OCO supplemental request. The FY 2010 funds will enable the ANA to grow while providing basic and specialized training for the ANP.

Afghan National Army

Building on the FY 2009 OCO request, the FY 2010 OCO budget will provide the expanded ANA with the capacity and capabilities that will allow it to assume the lead for counterinsurgency and internal operations. The FY 2010 OCO request, which supports a larger, more comprehensive and more capable military force, builds on the current success made by the ANA. These soldiers have fought bravely along side U.S. and Coalition forces and have earned the respect of the Afghan people.

Commando Battalions, focused on the counterinsurgency mission, are now part of the Afghanistan planned military force. The Army will now also include combat support units, including engineering units, military intelligence companies, and military police. The FY 2010 OCO request includes funds to increase and sustain these units as well.

Afghan National Police

The revised ANSF program recognized that a more robust police force is required to contribute to the counterinsurgency effort by maintaining security throughout Afghanistan, particularly in areas from which the ANA and international forces have cleared Taliban fighters. The original ANP program focused on a more narrow law enforcement mission, leaving the ANP less capable of addressing a security environment complicated by Taliban, narco-traffickers, and other illegal elements.

In comparison with the ANA, the ANP lagged in progress, due in part to institutional corruption, low literacy rates among recruits, and a history of low pay. The FY 2010 OCO request continues the sustainment and training of the 86,800 person ANP and provides funds to equip the force for operation in a counterinsurgency environment. The budget will provide vehicles for the Fire Department and Uniform Police and Border Police facilities. The budget continues to provide the ANP with basic and specialized training and supports the Afghanistan Police Protection Force (APPF), a new Ministry of Interior initiative that encourages community security operations intended to marginalize insurgent activities, prevent insurgent attacks, and deny insurgents access to and support from local villages.

To address one of Afghanistan's key police issues, the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) introduced the Focused District Development (FDD) Program, a pilot initiative designed for the critical development requirements of the ANP in each district. The FDD provides a strong reform program that focuses resources on the district level Afghan Uniform Police (AUP) by providing district police training for an entire unit. The FDD takes into account the need to professionalize the police and eliminate corruption in order to ensure that systems of justice, governance, development, and outreach are in place; contribute to local security; and support a stable, well-respected Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA). The FDD initiative is complementary to ongoing International Security

Assistance Force (ISAF) operations and will center on the Eastern and Southern regions, with eventual expansion throughout the country. The CSTC-A also placed increased emphasis on the training and mentoring of the Afghan Border Police (ABP) through the Focused Border Development (FBD), which began in October 2008 and is similar to FDD. The FY 2010 OCO request includes funding for training and mentoring of the ABP, as well as construction of ABP facilities.

Additionally, the Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP), a specialized unit with tactical gear, improved force protection, and specialized equipment. The ANCOP's primary role is that of a national quick reaction force for civil emergencies like the May 2006 Kabul riots. The ANCOP also relieve district Afghan Uniform Police (AUP) forces while those forces are reformed and receive training through the FDD process.

Detainee Operations

Funding for Detainee Operations supports the Afghan National Detention Facility at Pol-e-Charki and mentors and organizes, trains, and equips a self-sustaining detainee guard program within the MoD for the detention of Afghan enemy combatants. The FY 2010 OCO funds will be spent on sustainment and training of the guard force.

SUMMARY

The GIRoA does not have the financial capability, the experienced security forces, or the infrastructure required to equip, build, and sustain a reliable, effective security force alone. Without U.S. funding, the GIRoA will be unable to counter the increasing threat of a well-armed anti-Coalition militia, Taliban, Al Qaeda, narco-terrorists, and other anti-government elements that threaten the peace and stability of Afghanistan. This is a critical capability to prevent re-emergence of safe havens when the Afghans eventually take full responsibility for security in their country.

Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund

HIGHLIGHTS


Policy

It is the policy of the United States to support the Government of Pakistan in building the capability of its security forces.

FY 2010 Request: \$0.7B


- Builds the capabilities of the Pakistan Security Forces to secure their borders, fight insurgents, and prevent their territory from becoming a safe haven for extremists
- Funds the U.S. Security Development Plan for Pakistan and the training and equipment needed to develop the counterinsurgency capabilities of the Pakistan Security Forces

FY 2010 Overseas Contingency Operations



Total Annual Cost

\$ in Billions



Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund	FY 2009 Supplemental			FY 2010
\$ in Billions	Bridge Enacted	Request	Total	Request
Infrastructure	_	<0.1	<0.1	0.1
Equipment and Transportation	_	0.4	0.4	0.5
Humanitarian Relief	_	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1
Training and Operations	_	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1
Total Pakistan COIN Capability Fund		0.4	0.4	0.7

Numbers may not add due to rounding

DESCRIPTION

The Department of Defense requests \$0.7 billion to accelerate the development of Pakistan's counterinsurgency capabilities and operations in support of U.S. efforts in OEF. This funding is required to continue and expand the activities that were initiated in the FY 2009 Overseas Contingency Operations request for the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund (PCCF). The FY 2010 funding represents an increase of 75 percent above the FY 2009 level of \$0.4 billion.

The purpose of the PCCF is to improve Pakistan's ability to secure its borders, deny safe haven to extremists, fight insurgents, and provide security for the indigenous population in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region. This Fund will help Pakistan, a critical ally in OEF, to develop expanded counterinsurgency capabilities to improve success in overcoming extremists on the Pakistan side of the border with Afghanistan, thus increasing the opportunity for victory in Afghanistan. Support for Pakistan's security forces fighting in the western frontier region will help ensure a more successful outcome for OEF.

The goal is to: 1) fund the U.S. Security Development Plan (SDP); 2) assist Pakistan Security Forces to organize, train,



U.S. Navy Capt. Kevin P. Campbell, the commanding officer of the guided-missile cruiser USS Lake Champlain (CG 57), and Lt. J.G. Rebecca A. Faunt, a helicopter pilot, show Pakistani navy Lt. Abid, a deck division officer, the equipment and shipboard procedures used on board the ship while in port in Karachi, Pakistan. Lake Champlain is in the area to participate in the multinational naval exercise Aman 2009. The 10-day exercise focuses on air, surface and maritime security training and includes representatives from 38 countries and ships from 11 nations, including the United States, the United Kingdom, Pakistan and Australia.

DoD photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Daniel Barker, U.S. Navy - March 2009

equip, and operate as a counterinsurgency-capable force; and 3) provide humanitarian relief in post-combat/conflict areas. By providing increased resources, the PCCF will support a program to help the Government of Pakistan build the counterinsurgency capability of the Pakistan Security Forces.

Lack of funding could reduce the capability of Pakistan's security forces to pursue terrorists that threaten the United States and its allies and could impede success in OEF.

FUNDING REQUEST

The PCCF will be used to improve the counterinsurgency capabilities of Pakistan's defense and border security forces by continuing the SDP. The SDP is a multiyear program designed to enhance Pakistan's capability to secure the border with Afghanistan, deny safe haven for terrorists, and provide security for the indigenous population in Pakistan's border regions. The SDP is a critical program to help build counterinsurgency capabilities in Pakistan and to date has been funded using a number of authorities, such as Counternarcotics and DoD Section 1206 (Global Train and Equip). The PCCF will provide a single authority and the requisite funding to help achieve success on the ground in Afghanistan.

In addition to funding the SDP, the PCCF will support the replacement of equipment necessary for the Pakistan Security Forces to conduct counterinsurgency operations against enemy militants. Replacing Pakistan Army assets destroyed during 7 years of operations in the border regions between Pakistan and Afghanistan will give new life to units fighting a war with dated and depleted equipment. This includes requirements for: tactical wheeled vehicles, utility helicopters, armored personnel carriers, tactical radio equipment, and specialized ammunition.

To perform more effectively in its counterinsurgency role, the Pakistan military also requires training and several specific

combat multipliers including: Army aviation helicopters; close air support capability; night fighting capability; training and a civil affairs/humanitarian relief capability.

SUMMARY

Success in Afghanistan lies in part in Pakistan's ability to deny safe haven for terrorists. Funding a robust counterinsurgency capability for Pakistan will serve as a combat multiplier and increase success in OEF. Lack of funding could result in a Pakistan less capable of defeating extremists that threaten the democratic government in Pakistan, United States regional partners, and the U.S. homeland.



Coalition Support

HIGHLIGHTS


Policy

It is the policy of the United States to support Coalition partners who are participating in U.S. military operations to counter terrorism, and may not otherwise have the financial or logistical means to do so.

FY 2010 Request: \$1.9B


- Continues reimbursements to Pakistan, Jordan, and other key cooperating nations for their support to U.S. military operations
- Funds airlift and sustainment for partner nations in Iraq, Afghanistan

FY 2010 Overseas Contingency Operations



Total Annual Cost

\$ in Billions




Coalition Support	FY 20	FY 2009 Supplemental		
\$ in Billions	Bridge Enacted	Request	Total	Request
Coalition Support Funds	0.2	1.0	1.2	1.6
Lift and Sustain	0.1	0.4	0.5	0.3
Kyrgyz Republic Air Traffic Control & Safety System	_	<0.1	<0.1	_
Total Coalition Support	0.3	1.4	1.7	1.9

Numbers may not add due to rounding *Funded in base budget in FY 2009 and beyond

DESCRIPTION

The Department of Defense requests \$1.9 billion to continue support for foreign partners in FY 2010, a 12 percent increase over the FY 2009 requirement level of \$1.7 billion. The Department requires additional Coalition Support Funds to continue payments to Pakistan, where claims have increased to approximately \$120 million per month due to the escalation of operations in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP). These funds will enable the Department of Defense to leverage the support of foreign partners by reimbursing them for expenses incurred in support of U.S. military operations (Coalition Support Funds) and providing logistical support (Lift and Sustain) to countries that are participating in U.S. military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Funding to support these efforts is extremely critical to current operations.

The composition of the Coalition is more diverse than in the past, and the conflict in Afghanistan more intense. The Coalition and friendly foreign countries who receive support are able to participate in U.S. military operations only because of the provision of financial support, in the form of reimbursements for



expenses incurred (or to be incurred) or provision of transportation, sustainment, and subsistence when the forces are down-range.

The FY 2010 funding request will:

- Ensure Pakistan, Jordan, and key cooperating nations are reimbursed for support to U.S. operations (\$1.6 billion);
- Provide funding to pay for Lift and Sustainment support to Coalition forces in Afghanistan and Iraq (\$0.3 billion)

These programs support U.S. military operations and reduce the stress on U.S. forces. Failure to fully fund these programs would jeopardize the continued support of important partners like Pakistan and Jordan who conduct key border operations. Lack of requested funds could also minimize participation of foreign partners like Poland, Romania, and Georgia who plan to deploy thousands of troops to Afghanistan. All of these funding requirements serve as force multipliers providing increased troop strength and enhanced safety for U.S. military operations.

FUNDING REQUEST

Coalition Support Funds

Continued support from Congress for Coalition Support Funds is critical to supporting countries that are able to make a military contribution to Overseas Contingency Operations but do not have the means to finance their participation. The Department's request for FY 2010 is \$1.6 billion.

Specific examples of the results of DoD Coalition Support Funds include:

Pakistan

 Since October 2001 through April 2009, the United States has reimbursed Pakistan approximately \$6.4 billion for operations in support of OEF.

- Pakistan, a key ally in Operation Enduring Freedom, regularly engages enemy forces, arrests and kills Taliban and Al Qaeda forces, and renders significant support to U.S. forces operating in Afghanistan.
- Pakistan has increased its forces to more than 110,000 troops in the border region with Afghanistan and has suffered over 1,400 deaths of military and security forces personnel since September 11, 2001.
- The United States reimburses Pakistan for military support to Operation Enduring Freedom. The expenses Pakistan incurs to conduct joint operations against Al Qaeda and Taliban forces include providing logistical support for its forces and manning observation posts along the Afghanistan border.

Jordan

- Since October 2001 through April 2009, the United States has reimbursed Jordan close to \$0.5 billion for operations that Jordan is conducting in support of OEF and OIF.
- Despite limited economic means, Jordan conducts border operations along the Jordan-Iraq border. These operations are having a major impact in curbing undesirables transiting across the border.
- Jordan also operates two field hospitals in Iraq and Afghanistan, providing medical treatment to thousands of injured Coalition forces and civilians.

• Other Key Cooperating Nations

 Other partners including Georgia, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyz Republic, Romania, Ukraine, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Tonga, and Mongolia have received reimbursements with Coalition Support Funds. These countries have supported the Coalition and reduced requirements for U.S. soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Lift and Sustain

Lift and Sustain funds are essential to enable the Department to support coalition and friendly foreign forces with vital logistical support in the form of transportation to and from Iraq and Afghanistan and sustainment and subsistence while serving with and alongside U.S. forces. Coalition and friendly foreign forces who receive this support would not be able to participate without this support. The Department's request for FY 2010 is \$0.3 billion.

Since FY 2005, the Department has provided approximately \$1.4 billion of support to lift and sustain foreign forces with a lesser capacity to pay.

Without these funds, foreign countries that lack the financial means to transport their forces to and from Iraq and Afghanistan or to sustain their forces for extended deployments would not be able to participate. Support from the United States allows these forces to remain in-theater and to contribute to U.S. military overseas contingency operations. Without this vital support, the foreign forces may have to return home, increasing the burden on U.S. forces.

SUMMARY

It is clear the United States cannot succeed in Overseas Contingency Operations alone. The support of foreign partners is fundamental to operational success, and U.S. financial and logistical support is necessary to ensure their continued participation.

Coalition Support Funds are vital. They enable foreign partners to support U.S. military operations and receive reimbursement of their actual expenses. Without this program, the United States



will not be able to reimburse Pakistan and Jordan for critical border operations or support countries like Poland, Romania, and others who are willing to serve in key roles in U.S. military operations but lack the needed training and equipment to ensure safety of U.S. and other foreign forces. Without support from friendly foreign forces, the U.S. military may be required to take on operations better covered by partner nations. In the case of Pakistan and Jordan border operations, the United States would likely not be able to conduct these operations as capably as the indigenous forces.

Without Lift and Sustain funding, many foreign countries would not be able to maintain their forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. This would adversely affect U.S. operations by placing an additional burden on U.S. forces. Without support in Afghanistan, NATO members with limited economies, such as Poland, Romania, and Georgia may not be able to participate thus hindering the ability of NATO and the United States to succeed in Afghanistan.

Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP)

HIGHLIGHTS


Policy

It is the policy of the Department of Defense to provide commanders in the field with a flexible source of funds to assist local populations with urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction.

FY 2010 Request: \$1.5B


- Funds a variety of critical, small-scale humanitarian relief and reconstruction projects as identified by commanders in the field, such as:
 - Protective measures
 - Transportation and roads
 - Health and education needs
 - Power lines and generators
- Incorporates reduced requirements for CERP funding to Iraq, given changing conditions on the ground and increased Government of Iraq capacity to provide support to its people.

FY 2010 Overseas Contingency Operations



Total Annual Cost

\$ in Billions



Commander's Emergency Response	FY 2009 Supplemental			FY 2010
Program \$ in Billions	Bridge Enacted	Request	Total	Request
Commander's Emergency Response Fund	1.0	0.5	1.4	1.5

Numbers may not add due to rounding

DESCRIPTION

The Department of Defense requests \$1.5 billion to continue support of the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) for FY 2010. This represents a 7 percent increase above the FY 2009 level of \$1.4 billion.

FUNDING REQUEST

The CERP enables commanders in the field to respond quickly to urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction needs by executing programs that will assist the people of Afghanistan and Iraq. As such, CERP is a dynamic, flexible program that provides commanders with the tools to address local concerns, bolster support for local governments, and undermine insurgents. The CERP's demonstrated multiplier effect continues to help U.S. forces hold recent security gains and counter insurgent influence. The FY 2010 request is required to continue to support the ground commander's ability to respond to local humanitarian relief and reconstruction needs.

Insurgent activities continue to destabilize neighborhoods and degrade infrastructure, health, education, and economic life in both countries. Military commanders consider CERP a key tool to maintain and expand stability gains. Commanders apply funds to assist in alleviating the hardships inflicted on the civilian population of Afghanistan and Iraq and providing needed relief and reconstruction. The request for FY 2010 is critical to

CERP Categories

Types of Payments/Projects Funded by CERP – FY 2007/2008

Water/Sanitation – Repair or reconstruction of water treatment plants, sanitation facilities, pump stations, pipelines, wells, sewers

Education – School repair/furnishings; education supplies, student backpacks, sport areas

Electricity – Repair or reconstruction of electricity stations, power lines, generators, street lights

Food Production & Distribution – Humanitarian food deliveries, livestock, animal feed, slaughterhouse repair, fish farms

Healthcare – Hospital and health care center repair, medical equipment, wheelchairs, ambulances

Agriculture/Irrigation – Irrigation stations and canals, increase agriculture production

Protective Measures – Contracts for security at reconstruction projects, oil refinery and pipeline facilities

Civic/Cultural Repair – Repair to religious buildings, museums, libraries, cultural centers, city halls, fire stations

Telecommunications – Repair or reconstruction of telecommunication systems infrastructure.

Transportation - Road repair, paving, highway guard rails and lights

Condolence Payments – Payment to individual civilians for death or injury

Battle Damage/Repair – Payments for property damage, economic and financial improvement

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achieving additional security and developing gains in Afghanistan and sustaining security gains in Iraq.


The CERP funds Military Commanders' projects related to water and sanitation; food production and distribution; agriculture; electricity production and distribution; healthcare; education; telecommunications; transportation; irrigation; civic cleanup; repair of civic and cultural facilities; economic, financial and management improvements; efforts to improve rule of law and governance; condolence payments and former detainee payments; reimbursement for losses incurred as a result of U.S., Coalition or supporting military operations; protective measures to ensure the viability and survivability of critical infrastructure sites; and other urgent humanitarian or reconstruction projects.

Increasing Government of Iraq Participation

The Gol has assumed responsibility for substantial reconstruction costs. Responsibility for payments to the Sons of Iraq (Sol) will completely transfer to the Gol in FY 2009.

Iraq-CERP (I-CERP)

With the success of the U.S. appropriated CERP funds in Iraq, the GoI provided \$270.0 million of Iraqi funds in April 2008, to be executed through the established CERP processes in Iraq. Although the U.S. military is the I-CERP executor, these funds are restricted by Iraqi requirements and priorities; they cannot substitute for the U.S. CERP funds and are kept separate. The GoI has designated use of I-CERP for urgent reconstruction projects benefiting the Iraqi people in the 15 non-Kurdish provinces at specific proportions.



SUMMARY

Without CERP funds in request, commanders in the field would lose a proven, effective, and flexible tool in the counterinsurgency fights in Afghanistan and Iraq. Commanders would be less able to rapidly respond to immediate needs of the Afghan and Iraqi people or to apply resources to activities that build trust, provide stability and security, and ultimately result in the increased safety of U.S. and Coalition personnel.

Military Construction

HIGHLIGHTS


Policy

It is the policy of the Department of Defense to carry out the minimum construction necessary to support wartime operations and enhance force protection.

FY 2010 Request: \$1.4B


 Funds infrastructure projects in Regional Commands – East and South – to support the realignment of U.S. forces into and within Afghanistan

FY 2010 Overseas Contingency Operations



Total Annual Cost

\$ in Billions



Military Construction	FY	FY 2009 Supplemental		
\$ in Billions	Bridge Enacted	Request	Total	Request
Operational Facilities	_	0.5	0.5	0.8
Roads and Bridges	_	0.1	0.1	<0.1
Basic Infrastructure	_	0.1	0.1	<0.1
Force Protection	_	_		0.1
Camp Lemonier, Djibouti	_	_		
Logistics Support Facilities	_	0.2	0.2	0.4
Environmental/Landfills	_	_		0.1
Total Military Construction	_	0.9	0.9	1.4

Numbers may not add due to rounding

DESCRIPTION

The Department of Defense requests \$1.4 billion for critical military construction projects in Afghanistan for FY 2010. This represents an increase of 56 percent above the FY 2009 level of \$0.9 billion. The FY 2010 projects continue the construction efforts started in FY 2009 that are specifically requested to support the realignment of forces into and within Afghanistan, both enabling strategic and operational flexibility and increasing Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Military construction is a key enabler in the capabilities. Overseas Contingency Operations, directly supporting wartime operations by providing operational and support facilities at key locations in the U.S. Central Command's area of responsibility.

FUNDING REQUEST

The requested funds primarily support the increase in forces in Afghanistan. In Regional Command (RC) – East, military construction projects will support ongoing operations, as well as increased presence at several contingency operating bases. The



Department's request also provides infrastructure projects that increase its ability to enable both strategic and operational flexibility to support the President's decision to increase U.S. force levels in Afghanistan, particularly in RC-South. Such projects will increase the capacity of U.S. air-lines of communication in theater, broaden U.S. logistics and ISR capabilities throughout the theater, and provide the Commander, U.S. Forces Afghanistan, with the ability to reposition forces as necessary to counter emerging threats or reinforce successful operations.

Operational Facilities

The request includes \$0.8 billion for operational facilities, primarily focused on increased aviation support and command and control capabilities. Projects such as close air support ramps at Bastion/Tombstone and Kandahar, runway upgrades at Salerno and Gardez, a refueler apron at Kandahar, and rotary wing parking at Sharana are crucial to support airlift capabilities and planned operations. Associated projects, such as fuel operations facilities and cargo handling areas, support the Department's readiness by increasing supplies at key locations. Further, Command and Control facilities at Kabul, Kandahar, and Bagram are pivotal to ensuring operational control in RC-East and South.

Roads and Bridges

The request includes <\$0.1 billion for construction of roads at Bagram and Kandahar to support the influx of troops and equipment at these enduring locations.

Basic Infrastructure

Critical infrastructure projects such as water supply and distribution systems, drainage systems, and electrical systems at Tombstone/Bastion, Salerno, Bagram, Sharana, and Shank

are included in this request, reflecting the high demand at those bases. The amount requested for these basic infrastructure projects is <\$0.1 billion.

Force Protection

Perimeter expansion projects in Kabul and Jalalabad, and an entry control point at Tombstone/Bastion, will provide safer facilities. The request includes \$0.1 billion.

Logistics/Support Facilities

The request also includes \$0.4 billion for logistics and support facilities at several key locations in RC-East and RC-South to support increased operations. A Level 3 medical facility at Tombstone/Bastion, ammunition supply points, vehicle compounds and warehouses at various locations increase the logistics and medical capacity. Additionally, life support areas at several locations provide austere dining facilities and contingency troop housing at smaller forward operating bases such as Dwyer, Maywand, Frontenac, Shank, Tarin Kowt, and Gardez.

Environmental Facilities

The request also includes \$0.1 billion to address environmental concerns at 15 locations by building waste management complexes which will more efficiently and effectively dispose of waster material and create a healthier environment for deployed forces.

SUMMARY

These military construction projects have been requested by the Commander, U.S. Central Command, and are critical because of the immediacy and volume of the troop movements and the scarcity of supporting infrastructure in Afghanistan.

Reconstitution

HIGHLIGHTS


Policy

It is the policy of the Department of Defense to ensure force readiness by quickly repairing or replacing equipment that has been destroyed, damaged, stressed, or worn out in Overseas Contingency Operations, and by providing critical equipment and technology for future deploying forces.

FY 2010 Request: \$17.6B


 Funds continued replenishment, replacement, and repair of equipment utilized in Overseas Contingency Operations worldwide.

FY 2010 Overseas Contingency Operations



Total Annual Cost

\$ in Billions



Reconstitution \$ in Billions	FY	FY 2009 Supplemental		
	Bridge Enacted	Request	Total	FY 2010 Request
Replenishment				
Army	0.1	1.0	1.1	0.8
Navy	_	0.1	0.1	0.3
Marine Corps	_	0.3	0.3	0.5
Air Force	<u> </u>	0.2	0.2	0.3
Total Replenishment	0.1	1.6	1.7	1.8
Replacement				
Army	1.6	5.8	7.4	3.3
Navy	<u> </u>	0.5	0.5	0.4
Marine Corps	0.2	1.0	1.2	0.6
Air Force	0.2	1.1	1.3	0.4
Defense-wide	<u> </u>	0.4	0.4	0.1
Total Replacement	2.0	8.8	10.8	4.9
Repair				
Army	7.9	_	7.9	7.9
Navy	0.4	0.2	0.6	1.2
Marine Corps	0.5	0.2	0.7	0.6
Air Force	0.7	0.7	1.4	1.2
Total Repair	9.5	1.1	10.6	10.9
Total Reconstitution	11.6	11.6	23.2	17.6

Numbers may not add due to rounding

DESCRIPTION

The Department of Defense requests \$17.6 billion for the timely reconstitution of equipment used during Overseas Contingency Operations, primarily in Iraq and Afghanistan. This represents a decline of 24 percent from the FY 2009 level of \$23.2 billion.

Reconstitution encompasses maintenance and procurement activities to restore and enhance combat capability to units and



pre-positioned equipment that were destroyed, damaged, stressed, or worn beyond economic repair due to combat operations. Reconstitution is funded through a variety of appropriations, and includes the replenishment, replacement, and repair of equipment.

FUNDING REQUEST

Combat operations put considerable stress on U.S. military equipment beyond that incurred during peacetime operations. Overseas Contingency Operations require the military to use its equipment at much higher rates than in routine peacetime missions. In Afghanistan and Iraq, usage rates have run two to eight times higher than comparable peacetime rates.

In addition to higher rates of use, the very nature of warfare places additional stress on equipment. Whether evading enemy fire, surviving improvised explosive devices (IEDs), or engaging enemy forces in direct combat, equipment is used under extreme conditions. The damage resulting from combat operations, coupled with the reduced time available for detailed maintenance, leads to an accumulation of wear and tear on equipment.


The harsh physical environment, both terrain and climate, in Afghanistan and Iraq causes equipment damage, further increasing maintenance requirements. Parts such as turbine engines for aircraft and tanks tend to fail more often when operating under harsh conditions. Moreover, the wear on these subsystems steadily diminishes their ability to be rebuilt or reused, ultimately increasing replacement and maintenance costs. Another contributor to equipment stress is the practice of adding armor to unarmored trucks. The extra weight combined with the occasional need to shift loads in ways for which the vehicles were not designed, places greater stress on the tires, suspensions, frames, and power trains of these systems.

During reconstitution, older systems are replaced with new models designed to accept and carry armor.

Replenishment

Timely replenishment of equipment is critical to ensuring the deploying units have the equipment needed to achieve the mission.

This category provides for replenishment of ammunition and missile stocks consumed in pre-deployment training of accelerated Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) and forces in the fight. The BCTs are equipped with significantly more weapons and require individual and crew training to reach proficiency prior to deployment.



Replenishment includes conventional ammunition items for all services, such as bombs, artillery rounds, small and medium caliber mortars, rockets, aircraft launched rockets and flares, demolition materials, grenades, propellant charges, simulators, cartridges and non-lethal munitions. The request also funds precision guided ammunition items such as the Army's Excalibur artillery round and the Air Force's Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM).

The request also funds tactical missiles to replace those expended in combat, such as Hellfire, Javelin, Tube-Launched Optically Tracked Wire Guided (TOW), Guided Multiple Launched Rockets, and Small Diameter Bomb.

Replacement

Reconstitution funding provides for the replacement of equipment lost in battle or stressed beyond economic repair. This ranges



from major platforms such as UH-60 and CH-47 aircraft, to support equipment such as radios, power equipment, and construction equipment.

Funds are also requested for aircraft modifications designed to replace or upgrade capabilities required to support Overseas Contingency Operations, such as various aircraft targeting pods.

The request includes funding for the replacement of combat and logistics support equipment needed to maintain and sustain operations in the theater, such as secure radios, communications network switches, terrestrial and satellite receivers, and small arms and surveillance equipment, which are needed to allow U.S. forces to maintain a tactical advantage. The request also includes funding for a myriad of day-to-day use items such as generators, tools, power equipment and construction equipment.

The request also funds the replacement and modification of a wide variety of support vehicles lost in battle or stressed beyond economic repair. Examples of vehicle replacements and modifications include the following:

- High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV) Lightweight high performance four wheel drive air transportable and air droppable family of tactical vehicles, some equipped with TOW missile firing capability
- Family of Heavy Tactical Vehicles A combination of heavy tanker, wrecker, cargo, and tractor trucks used in line haul, local haul, unit resupply and other missions throughout the tactical environment to support modern combat vehicles

In addition to major platforms such as aircraft and vehicles, it is important to emphasize that reconstitution funding provides for the replacement of day-to-day support equipment necessary to keep the platforms operating at peak combat readiness. This support equipment includes aircraft and vehicle spare parts, radios and other command and communications equipment, bridges, containers, medical equipment, power equipment, tools and other construction equipment, water purification and fuel distribution systems, air traffic control equipment, small boats, salvage equipment, explosive ordinance disposal equipment, night vision equipment, and portable shelters. Replacing these items as they wear out is critical not only to the operation of the platforms, but also to the subsistence of the soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen.

Repair

Repair activities involve the necessary depot and intermediate level maintenance required to restore equipment returning from Iraq and Afghanistan to pre-deployment conditions.

For the Army, the request funds depot and intermediate repair of a wide variety of platforms such as helicopters, trucks, HMMWVs, Bradley, Stryker, and other tactical vehicles. It also funds repair of support equipment such as radios, power equipment, physical security equipment, and construction equipment.

For the Department of the Navy, this request funds the repair of aircraft, ships, and support equipment. This also includes the cost to overhaul, clean, inspect, and maintain equipment to the required condition at the conclusion of an operation. Major components include:

- Airframe rework
- Engine rework
- Aeronautical components
- Ship operating systems

The request funds Air Force Depot Purchased Equipment Maintenance (DPEM) and Contractor Logistics Support (CLS). Aircraft continuously deployed in support of OEF and OIF experience extreme operational demands in harsh

environments, thus accelerating the need for repairs to maintain operational capability. Funding will support bomber and fighter weapon systems used in support of operations including the B-1, F-15, F-16, and ground stations for Military Strategic and Tactical Relay Satellite (MILSTAR) and Global Broadcast Service (GBS). Also included is CLS funding that addresses the wear and tear resulting from the flying hours associated with KC-10, C-21, C-37, C-40, U-2, and Global Hawk in support of Overseas Contingency Operations. Increased flying hours have driven increased costs for spares, repairs, and replenishment, as well as additional contract Field Team Support at deployed locations.

Air Force operational requirements, as a direct result of overseas contingency operation, have raised the demand for



depot level repairs. The FY 2010 OCO funding request provides fleet-wide refurbishment for Active Duty Air Force, Air Force Reserve, and Air National Guard. Funding will support depot maintenance overhauls for multiple aircraft (e.g., A-10, B-52, C-5, C-130, F-16 and KC-135). Additionally, funds will allow for depot maintenance and depot software maintenance for missiles.

SUMMARY

Replacing, repairing, and replenishing the complex equipment in the U.S. inventory is critical to continuing the Overseas Contingency Operations. Given the harsh conditions in Afghanistan and Iraq, application of Reconstitution funding has been central to military readiness.

Operations in Afghanistan and Iraq are placing demands on equipment far beyond what is typically experienced during training or home-station operations. These higher demands increase reconstitution requirements for equipment employed in the theater, and they do not end when units and equipment redeploy to the home station. The Department's ability to sustain itself through reconstitution efforts is essential to ensuring that the nation has a ready and reliable military force. Reconstitution is a cost of war and one of several components affecting readiness.

Without the requested reconstitution funds, overall U.S. military ability to support deploying units will suffer. Critical military capabilities will be deficient, and combat air, mobility, and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) support pledged to Combatant Commanders will not meet mission requirements. In sum, without the requested reconstitution funding the Department will not be able to support and train the next deploying forces.

